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To fight and conquer in all battles is not supreme excellence; supreme 
excellence consists in breaking one’s resistance without fighting.
—Sun Tzu
Introduction
The canvas of modern day conflict is diverse, with many interlinked or 
diverse dimensions, to include conventional conflicts (including nuclear 
adversaries), cyber, space, economic, use of terrorists, insurgents or 
religious extremism. The merging or blurring of conflicts and war forms 
is gradually transforming into a hybrid nature, wherein adversaries are 
likely to maximise the war-fighting capability at their disposal to include 
asymmetric or irregular tactics.1
In the Indian context, there is a distinct regional dimension to the 
challenges faced, with two nuclear neighbours with unresolved border 
disputes. Both adversaries bring different capabilities to the table: while 
Pakistan is specialised in breeding and exporting religious terror, China, 
along with its conventional capabilities, specialises in cyber and non-
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contact warfare. Active borders, conflicts and collusion between these 
two neighbours further enhance the complexities and challenges for 
India. Unconventional, guerrilla or hybrid warfare is often considered a 
weapon of the weaker forces against a stronger adversary.2
Post abrogation of Article 370 and deterioration in Indo-Pak 
relations, Pakistan is running out of options and, therefore, would again 
attempt to activate, exploit and consolidate its hybrid resources. This is 
likely to manifest in activation of sleeper cells, surge in infiltration, fresh 
recruitment, recycling of some apprehended/surrendered terrorists and 
triggering of violent agitations in the hinterland of Jammu & Kashmir 
(J&K). To predict and prepare for likely threats in the future, it is 
essential to understand and contextualise the hybrid warfare capabilities 
of Pakistan.3
Understanding the Hybrid Threat
Frank Hoffman, from the US Marine Centre of Emerging Threats and 
Opportunities, defines a hybrid threat as “a form of conflict in which state 
and non-state actors simultaneously exploit all modes—conventional, 
irregular, terrorists, disruptive or criminal to destabilise an existing order”.4 
A hybrid threat is also defined as a “diverse and dynamic combination 
of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified 
to achieve mutually benefitting effects”.5 Hybrid warfare, as defined by 
the hybrid doctrine of the UK, is referred to as “warfare conducted by 
irregular forces that have access to sophisticated weapons and systems 
normally fielded by regular forces. Hybrid warfare may morph and adapt 
throughout an individual campaign, as circumstances and recourses 
allow’.6 
This warfare is, thus, the convergence of the physical and psychological, 
combatant and non-combatant, violence and nation-building, and kinetic 
and information approach. The most significant convergence is within 
the various modes of war. The key components of a hybrid threat, thus, 
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are the military, nation-state paramilitary force, terrorist groups, guerrilla 
units, criminal organisations and civil population, especially in view of 
J&K’s agitational dynamics.7
Historical Perspective
In the global context, hybrid threats are not new. There are numerous 
examples of a ‘weaker’ adversary using its relative asymmetric strength 
against its stronger opponent’s perceived weaknesses. Lawrence 
of Arabia, Changez Khan and the Afghan Wars are all testimony of 
this type of unrestricted war. The Viet Cong and People’s Army of 
Vietnam combined irregular and regular forces into conventional 
and unconventional units in fighting the French and US forces. The 
Russian experiences in Afghanistan bear testimony to the efficient use 
of irregulars in both urban and rural environments to bring to its knees 
the might of an erstwhile superpower. Russia, too, offensively used 
hybrid warfare by employing cyber warfare against Georgia. Hezbollah 
mixed conventional capabilities (such as anti-armour weapons, rockets, 
and command and control networks) with irregular tactics (including 
information warfare, non-uniformed combatants, and civilian 
shielding). The result was a tactical stalemate and strategic setback for 
Israel.
In the Indian context, the Arthashastra explains the treatise on 
statecraft and conduct of unrestricted warfare which is defined as 
“concealed war” and “silent war”, involving the use of assassins, insiders, 
informers and prostitutes aimed at winning battles against an adversarial 
king. Shivaji, Guru Govind Singh and Maharaja Ranjit Singh employed 
hybrid resources to achieve their political and military aims. During the 
1971 campaign, the Mukti Bahini, an armed organisation comprising 
regulars and irregulars wherein regulars were defectors from East 
Pakistani units, was employed by India in Bangladesh and greatly assisted 
it in achieving its political and military aims.
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In the specific context of Pakistan, it has since its creation, post 
independence and partition, treated India as its primary threat and enemy. 
Due to its inadequacy vis-à-vis India with regards to military and financial 
capability, it has historically exhibited its overdependence on irregulars 
and hybrid warfare. It employed them in 1947-48 to seize portions of 
J&K, with the battle for Srinagar by regular and irregular forces being a 
classical example. In 1965, the Razakars were employed by Pakistan as 
part of a carefully crafted strategy manifesting in the form of Op Gibraltor 
in the hill sector. During the Kargil misadventure in 1999, Pakistan 
employed a mix of terrorists and regular troops to occupy critical heights 
along the Line of Control (LoC). The unfolding of Op TOPAC over the 
last three decades with the aim to bleed India through a thousand cuts is 
also a typical manifestation of the hybrid strategy adopted by Pakistan.
Pakistan trained and inducted 80,000 Afghan Mujahideen for the 
collapse of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Its hand is seen in all terrorist 
actions perpetrated against India which include aid and abetment to 
the Sikh insurgency in Punjab; aid to the United Liberation Front of 
Assam (ULFA) movement in Assam; the ongoing virulent insurgency 
in Kashmir; cross-border infiltration; terrorist attacks in Indian cities; 
attack on the Indian Parliament; plane hijacking; attack across the LoC 
at Kargil; fake currency racket through Nepal; “Karachi project” to 
train Indian Mujahideen for committing acts of terror and sabotage in 
India; 26/11 attack in Mumbai in 2008; attack on the Indian Embassy 
in Afghanistan; and the Uri and Pulwama attacks. All these incidents 
establish the capability of the adversary to conduct intermittent acts of 
violence, sabotage and subversion at will against India.
Analysis of Hybrid Warfare by Pakistan
Pakistan, a country born out of hate, on religious faultlines and an ever 
growing tilt towards extremism has always been motivated exclusively 
by the twin forces of fundamentalism and intrinsic hatred towards India 
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throughout its existence. The evils of jihadism and terrorism have become 
Pakistan’s state policy, especially focussed towards India and Afghanistan. 
It has earned the notoriety of being the epicentre of global terrorism and 
has been India’s traditional adversary.8 
The ‘Quranic Concept of War’ was conceived by General Zia-ul-Haq, 
and propagated an aggressive, escalating and relentless jihad against non-
believers in the faith. Terrorism was justified through religious diktats as 
a means to achieve ultimate dominance. It further paved the way for the 
current employment of irregulars by asserting that jihad is not an exclusive 
domain of the professional soldier, nor is it restricted to the application of 
military force alone and, therefore, the nation’s entire strength must be 
applied to achieve the laid down objectives.9 It propounds that war is to 
be waged against the non-believers in the name of Allah, with a spirit of 
religious duty and obligation. The fidayeen concept was further ordained 
by propagating that death and life after death are inevitable and those 
who die fighting for the cause of Allah are blessed and would be suitably 
rewarded in paradise.
The concept exhorts all believers to strike terror into the hearts 
of their enemies, stating that terror is not only a means, but an end in 
itself, which can be instilled only if the opponent’s faith is destroyed. 
The thought process was formalised in a book in 1979, endorsed by, 
General Zia-ul-Haq, and was taught compulsorily to all Army officers.10 
It contributed to the radicalisation and lslamisation of the Pakistan Army 
and fomented extreme anti-India fervour. In future wars, the ‘Quranic 
Concept of War’ could be the singular unifying factor for jihadists to unite 
with the Pakistan armed forces against India. There is also a likelihood of 
propaganda regarding ‘Islam in Danger’ being used for indoctrination, 
urging all ‘true’ Muslims to take up arms against non-believers. This 
further cemented the role of sub-conventional or hybrid warfare against 
India.
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The military strategy of Pakistan has always been anti-India and 
Kashmir-centric, avoiding conventional war but achieving its aims through 
sub-conventional means. It has fomented proxy war in Kashmir while 
ensuring that its activities remain below the threshold of a conventional 
conflict. Its strategy of using the nuclear threat is again a form of mixing 
conventional, sub-conventional and nuclear capabilities against India. 
The current situation in J&K post revocation of Article 370, with 
communication shut down, and concerted and coordinated actions by 
the security forces has been tense but stable, and Pakistan, in spite of its 
best efforts, has not been able to create an adverse situation. It is likely 
that Pakistan, will now attempt to use all its hybrid capabilities to exploit 
the situation for its political and military gains.11
Pakistan’s hybrid warfare strategy has been conceptualised to function 
as an instrument of state/military policy and is designed as a force 
multiplier to exploit the strategic divide between India and Pakistan. It 
intends to enhance its force capability on the outbreak of hostilities. The 
hybrid warfare launched by Pakistan is likely to be multi-pronged with 
the likely aims to be as under:
  To mitigate its conventional shortcomings and keep the Indian armed 
forces engaged in sub-conventional operations, and retain the ability 
to calibrate relations.
  To further the divide and create mistrust between the Kashmiris and 
the Indian government by conducting sensational strikes on sensitive 
targets and instigating unrest.
  The create situations in the Valley to draw international attention 
and take the issue to international forums. It may also use this to 
draw attention away from its internal financial, cultural and social 
instability.
  To delay and disrupt Indian military operations to adversely impact 
India’s war-waging machinery.
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Pakistan’s hybrid war against India has multiple dimensions which 
apart from focusssing on J&K, have spread all across the country, with 
multiple sleeper cells, funding of radical organisations, cyber warfare, 
targeting through social media, paid domestic and international media and 
attempts to make inroads towards India from other neighbouring countries 
like Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh.12 Pakistan has established a well oiled 
and coordinated system of terror funding in J&K and other parts of India, 
including the metros like Mumbai. The impact of these networks has been 
witnessed in various bomb blasts across the nation, and the situation in 
J&K is the result of this elaborate terror funding network.
Enablers for Hybrid Warfare by Pakistan
Historical factors like partition post-independence, claim to J&K and 
subsequent creation of Bangladesh from East Pakistan are the biggest 
psychological and political reasons for Pakistan to continue the conflict 
with India.13 The LoC, unlike a well defined International Boundary (IB), 
has its own peculiarities, being not clearly demarcated and the terrain 
providing an opportunity for infiltration by terrorists in spite of the best 
efforts by the security forces. The civil population i.e, the demography 
with its quantum and characteristics as well as its location close to the 
LoC, provides the opportunity for hybrid threats.
The overall force asymmetry and unfavourable force ratios in the 
case of an all out conventional conflict is likely to put Pakistan in an 
obvious disadvantage against India. This has prompted the adversary to 
rely heavily upon irregulars and other hybrid resources to keep the Indian 
forces engaged in sub-conventional conflict on multiple fronts. One of 
the major enablers is the centralised power centre in terms of the Pakistan 
Army, which controls all the intelligence and military assets, along with 
access to funds. Pakistan has, over time, evolved its strategy and added 
multiple dimensions to its hybrid threat, which include use of the social 
media and fake news propaganda.14
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Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) plays a pivotal role as the 
coordinating agency in waging hybrid war against India. Its coordinated 
actions with the Inter-Services Public Relations Department (ISPR) 
of the Pakistan Army, through various wings and special cells, focus 
on propaganda for the domestic population, the Kashmiris and the 
international audience. This well oiled machinery, with adequate access 
to power centres and funds, acts as great enabler in conducting targeted 
hybrid warfare for conventional and sub-conventional operations during 
both war and peace. 
The China-Pakistan collusion provides Pakistan access to Chinese 
capabilities in cyber, military, space and economic warfare. The 
information warfare capabilities of China provide back-end support to 
Pakistan and facilitate the launch of hybrid threats against India.15 The 
human intelligence network of Pakistan, coupled with technological 
support from China, poses a serious hybrid threat to India and needs to 
be countered with a well devised and executed strategy. The availability of 
adequate expertise to exploit the social media and favourable print/visual 
media facilitates influencing the population and fomenting trouble.16
Hybrid Warfare During Conventional Operations 
If war is inevitable or a suitable opportunity presents itself in the form of 
an adverse internal situation in Kashmir, Pakistan may exploit it to fight a 
conventional war limited to J&K or across the entire front. The nuclear 
card may also be leveraged deftly during all stages of the conflict to 
restrict India by using international pressure.17 In the past, Pakistan has 
employed sub-conventional warfare as an adjunct to conventional war18. 
The appreciated contours of using hybrid warfare could involve building 
up local capability, while ensuring a high degree of non-attributability 
and then imperceptibly increasing the intensity of sub-conventional 
warfare, testing India’s ‘threshold of tolerance’ and shaping opinions in 
the chosen theatre of operations. However, in future hybrid wars, the 
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main effort could be sub-conventional, with an aim to ‘heat the iron’ 
while a conventional ‘hammer’ may be employed at an appropriate time 
to strike the ‘iron’ and conclude the short and localised campaign on a 
winning note.
Pakistan has a terror factory that produces terrorists for export to India, 
Afghanistan and across the globe.19 This bench strength of approximately 
1,600-1,800 terrorists will be used by Pakistan in conjunction with the 
regular conventional forces, along both the border and in the hinterland 
to degrade Indian military capabilities.20 The focus could be to foster 
unrest, communal riots, target logistics echelons, enhance the strength of 
commando troops in various operations and carry out sabotage missions.21
Measures to Counter Pakistan’s Hybrid War 
Multi-pronged, multi-dimensional and coordinated actions at the national 
and multi-agency levels are required to counter Pakistan’s hybrid threat. 
A coordinated strategy, planned and executed by the Indian government 
post abrogation of Article 370 has ensured that most of the hybrid assets 
of Pakistan have been isolated and countered. The current situation on 
the ground post revocation of Article 370 has left Pakistan frustrated, due 
to its inability to calibrate and initiate actions along the LoC and Kashmir 
Valley. This was achieved by targeting the over-ground workers and 
denying communication links, along with financial freedom. However, 
Pakistan continued its cyber and social media warfare by spreading 
propaganda via fake media news through international and domestic 
media houses.22 
The counter to any enemy threat needs to be planned and executed 
in the same domain by using better defensive and offensive capabilities. 
The first step in countering any threat is to understand the threat and 
ensure that all the agencies and individuals handling various dimensions of 
this versatile threat understand the dimensions and future developments 
in this form of warfare. Hybrid threats, thus, need to be countered 
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holistically, using all capabilities in the cyber, space, financial, diplomatic 
and military fields. The need of the hour is to create a central command 
and control organisation coordinating a multi-dimensional response 
to multiple threats to ensure a synergised and coordinated strategic 
response. Coordination in all these diverse fields can be achieved only 
by a centralised command and control organisation under the Prime 
Minister’s Office (PMO), whose primary function could be to coordinate 
actions by various sister agencies. The expertise of various branches of 
the security forces and civil agencies needs to be synergised towards the 
common goal of defeating the enemy’s evil designs. 
Conclusion
The casus belli between India and Pakistan is the state of J&K. The LoC 
provides Pakistan an ideal opportunity to launch a hybrid war with an 
aim to alter the status quo. Pakistan presently does, and will always, 
aim to create an anti-India feeling among the masses of Kashmir. The 
‘agitation dynamics’, if handled ineptly by the civil administration and 
security forces, can present an opportunity for Pakistan to exploit. The 
proliferation of the internet and social media in the Kashmir Valley and 
other parts of the state adds another dimension to the already complicated 
issue. Most prominently, Pakistan has the jihadi terrorists whenever it 
wants to muster them. The threat from Pakistan is, therefore, real and our 
security architecture needs to be suitably designed to mitigate and face 
the nuances of the hybrid threats.
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